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Abstract: This paper proposes a new conceptual framework of a liberal social order, which
emphasizes the freedom of action in social interaction and the freedom of participation in social
rule-making process.  Our articulation of public decision-making process can be interpreted as a
formal way of capturing the essence of constitutional democracy, which is an impure mixture
of constructivist rationalism and evolutionary rationalism, since we are bringing what is spon-
taneously evolved through individual experiments into the stage of public design and social
choice of a new institutional set of rules.  It is also construed as an impure mixture of perfect
procedural fairness and pure procedural fairness, since the public judgements to be formed
through public deliberations should pay due attention to the intrinsic value of procedures in
conferring agency freedom to individuals, as well as to the instrumental value of procedures in
expanding well-being freedom of individuals.
11. Introduction
There are two conceptual frameworks in the analysis of the social order in general, and
the liberal social order in particular, which were neatly identified and sharply contrasted by
Friedrich von Hayek (1960; 1973).1  The first framework, which von Hayek (1973, p.5) aptly
christened the constructivist rationalism, recognizes all social orders as the product of deliberate
human design, whereas the second framework, the so-called evolutionary rationalism whose
contemporary representative is von Hayek himself, regards all social orders as the outgrowth of
spontaneous evolution through unconscious human experiments.  In the special context of the
liberal social order, the constructivist rationalism embodies the belief that freedom can be
realized and maintained only through the rational design of social decision-making rules that
embodies libertarian social values, whereas the evolutionary rationalism finds the essence of
freedom in spontaneity and the absence of external  coercion.  
The constrast between these two conceptual frameworks seems to have been made too
sharply.  Indeed, in their extreme forms, they are both too rigid to be of help in properly under-
standing the social order.  On the one hand, von Hayek (1960, p.54 & p.61) maintained
throughout his entire career that the constructivist rationalism in its extreme form is outright
wrong: “Though freedom is not a state of nature but an artifact of civilization, it did not arise
from design.  The institutions of freedom, like everything freedom has created, were not estab-
lished because people foresaw the benefits they would bring ... .  Those who believe that all
useful institutions are deliberate contrivances and who cannot conceive of anything serving a
human purpose that has not been consciously designed are almost of necessity enemies of
freedom.”  On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that the line separating the evolutionary
rationalism from the blind acceptance and offhanded admiration of the status quo is not at all
clear.  It was Lionel Robbins (1961, p.71) who acutely observed in his review of von Hayek’s
Constitution of Liberty (1960) that “Hayek’s emphasis on the spontaneous and non-rational
origin of important elements in the social order is of quite fundamental importance for the
liberal outlook, but ... it is liable to become the foundation of an illiberal mysticism rather than
‘true’ liberalism unless it is understood that such elements are subject at all times to critical
scrunity from the standpoint of the requirements of public utility.”
It is worthwhile to recollect in this context that “public utility”, which Robbins referred
to in his remark on von Hayek’s evolutionary rationalism, is precisely the franchise of Kenneth
Arrow’s (1951/1963; 1987) social choice theory.  According to Arrow (1951, pp.22-23):
To the nominalist temperament of the modern period, the assumption of the existence of
the social ideal in some Platonic realm of being was meaningless.  The utilitarian phi-
losophy of Jeremy Bentham and his followers sought instead to ground the social good
2on the good of individuals.  The hedonist psychology associated with utilitarian phi-
losophy was further used to imply that each individual’s good was identical with his
desires.  Hence, the social good was in some sense to be a composite of the desires of
individuals.  A viewpoint of this type serves as a justification of both political democ-
racy and laissez-faire economics or at least an economic system involving free choice of
goods by consumers and of occupations by workers.
  
As an analytical vehicle to articulate this concept of “social good” or “public utility”,
Arrow introduced his justly famous tool of a social welfare function, which is a process or rule
f associating a social preference ordering  R with each profile of individual preference orderings
RN = (R1, R2, ..., Rn), where n (2 £ n < +  4  ) denotes the number of individuals in the
society, and Ri is individual i’s preference ordering: R = f(RN).  Given a social preference
ordering R thus constructed, and given an opportunity set S of available social alternatives, a
socially chosen alternative x* 0   S is such that x* is at least as good as any other alternative x in
S when the evaluation is made in accordance with R.  In this analytical scenario, once a social
welfare function f is rationally designed, and a profile RN of individual preference orderings is
aggregated into a social preference ordering R = f(RN), there is no further room for spontaneity
on the part of the individuals composing the society.  What is left to them is nothing other than
to implement silently the socially chosen alternative x* 0   S.  In other words, instead of com-
plementing the evolutionary rationalism à la von Hayek through “critical scrutiny [of the social
order] from the standpoint of the requirements of public utility” as was required by Robbins,
this common interpretation of the Arrow social choice theory seems to lead us to the other polar
extreme of the constructivist rationalism. 
To find a way out of this apparent impasse, let us remind ourselves of the two senses in
which we can reasonably talk about individual freedom in the liberal social order.  In the first
place, we may say that individuals are assured of freedom when they are not prevented from
pursuing spontaneous experiments in the game-theoretic social interaction with other indi-
viduals subject only to the universally applicable set of rules of the game.  It is clear that this is
the sense in which von Hayek (1960; 1973) talked about individual freedom in the liberal social
order.  Let us christen this first sense of freedom as the freedom of action in social interaction.
It goes without saying that the real substance of this sense of freedom hinges squarely on the
prescribed set of rules of the game.  Indeed, even when individuals are fully warranted of this
first sense of freedom, it may well be the case that individuals might have been forced into this
game-theoretic social interaction in the first place without making voluntary choice of their
own, or the universal set of rules of the game might have been designed by external authority
without allowing any say to individuals participating in the specified game-theoretic social inter-
3action.  Thus, the analysis of freedom in the liberal social order is obviously incomplete if this
first sense is the only sense in which we can talk about individual freedom.  
In the second place, we may say that individuals are assured of freedom when they are
entitled to participate in the social decision-making processes through which the set of rules of
the game to be played among them is publicly designed and socially chosen.  This second sense
of freedom received great emphasis by Isaiah Berlin (1958, pp.15-16) in his famous essay on
liberty when he wrote as follows: “[T]he connexion between democracy and individual liberty
is a good deal more tenuous than it seemed to many advocates of both.  The desire to be gov-
erned by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled,
may be as deep a wish as that of a free area for action, and perhaps historically older.  But it is
not a desire for the same thing.  So different is it, indeed, as to have led in the end to the great
clash of ideologies that dominates our world.”  Let us christen this second sense of freedom as
the freedom of participation in social rule-making processes.  
The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework for the social choice
theoretic analysis of the liberal social order by making effective use of these two concepts of
freedom.  The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reiterates the two concepts of freedom
we have just identified in some further details.  Amartya Sen’s (1970a, Chapter 6 & Chapter
6*; 1970b; 1992) pioneering contribution to the analysis of libertarian values in the social
choice theoretic framework is neatly evaluated in this context.  Section 3 expounds an alterna-
tive game form articulation of freedom of choice in social interaction, whereas Section 4 is
devoted to the game form articulation of freedom of participation in social rule-making pro-
cesses.  Section 5 makes some observations on the concept of constitutional democracy and
that of procedural justice in the light of our game form articulation of freedoms.  In Section 6
we conclude the paper with some remarks.                        
2. Two Concepts of Individual Freedom
The fundamental value premise  this paper is that the liberal social order must be such
that individuals composing the society should be warranted of the two identified senses of free-
dom, viz. the freedom of action in the game-theoretic social interaction, on the one hand, and
the freedom of paricipation in social rule-making processes, on the other.  
The importance of the first sense of freedom has been discussed extensively since the
time of John Stuart Mill (1859/1977), if not before, and we may find its eloquent contemporary
adovocate in von Hayek (1960; 1973).  It was he who reminded us of the instrumental value of
the freedom of action in social interaction in that it enables individuals to try out their respective
life chance by making independent and spontaneous experiments.  We should also emphasize
that the freedom of action in social interaction is indispensable for individuals to  maintain self-
4respect as personal agencies of themselves.  How can one maintain self-respect if he cannot but
silently implement an action which was dictated to him by an external authority?  In this sense,
it is the freedom of action in social interaction that helps individuals nourish themselves to grow
into fully-fledged and responsible social entities.  
No less important is the second sense of freedom, through which past experience of
individual experiments can exert influence on the public design and social choice of a new set
of rules of the game, or the revision of the existing set of rules, thereby enabling the universally
applicable rules of the game to be constantly subjected to the “critical scrutiny from the stand-
point of the requirements of public utility” as well as to reflect the spontaneous order generated
through social interaction among free individuals.  The second sense of freedom is also valua-
ble from the viewpoint of individual self-respect, since it enables individuals to feel that they
are taking active part in the basic design of the liberal social order.  How can one maintain self-
respect if he is not allowed to take part in the processes through which the universally appli-
cable set of rules regulating his life is publicly designed and socially chosen, even if the game
designed and chosen without his active participation happens to be impeccably “fair”? 
The more we emphasize the importance of these two senses of freedom, however, the
possible conflict between these two desiderata to be satisfied by the liberal social order, to
which Berlin called our attention, will become that much more serious.  It was Sen (1970a,
Chapter 6*; 1970b; 1992) who showed in terms of a social choice theoretic framework that this
conflict is not simply possible, but in fact logically inevitable.  This was a pioneering attempt to
introduce the libertarian values into the social choice theoretic framework along with the demo-
cratic values which Arrow introduced.  As an auxiliary step in orienting our own conceptual
framework, it seems worthwhile to examine Sen’s path-breaking attempt.2  
Sen’s articulation of the two senses of freedom starts with the description of social
states, which goes as follows.  Let X0 be the set of impersonal features of the world, and let N
be the set of all individuals in the society, viz. N = {1, 2, ..., n}, where n (2 £ n < + 4  ) is the
number of individuals composing the society.  For each individual i 0   N, let Xi be the set of
i’s personal features of the world.  Then the set of social states is described by X = X0 H   X1 H 
C  C  C   H   Xn.  Thus, each social state x 0   X is a list (x0; x1, ..., xn) of impersonal and personal
features of the world.  Given any social state x = (x0; x1, ..., xn) 0   X, and for each individual
i 0   N, let x-i = (x0; x1, ..., xi-1, xi+1, ..., xn).  Then, x can be represented as (xi; x-i).  In
what follows, we will say that the two social states x, y 0   X are i-variants for any i 0   N if and
only if x-i = y-i holds true.  Intuitively speaking, the two social states x and y are i-variants
for some individual i 0   N if and only if x and y differ only in the specification of i’s private
matter.  
5Let K denote the family of non-empty subsets of X, each element of which denotes an
opportunity set of available social states.  A choice function defined on K is a functional rela-
tionship C such that, for each S 0   K, C(S), to be called the choice set from S, is a non-empty
subset of S.  Modifying Arrow’s original conceptual framework slightly, let f* be the collec-
tive choice rule that maps each profile RN = (Rl, R2, ..., Rn) of individual preference orderings
on X into a social choice function on K: C = f*(RN).3 
Within this modified Arrovian framework, Sen captures the essence of the freedom of
participation in the social rule-making processes by means of the following two conditions im-
posed on the collective choice rule f*.  The first condition is that of Unrestricted Domain  to
the effect that individuals are free to express whatever preferences they want to be reflected in
social choice, as long as these preferences satisfy the logical properties of completeness and
transitivity.4  The second condition is for the minimal effectiveness of the first condition, and it
requires that the expressed individual preferences must be positively reflected in social choice,
as long as these preferences coincide in claiming that a social state x is better than another social
state y.  To be more precise, the second condition can be expressed as follows:
Weak Pareto Principle
For every profile RN = (Rl, R2, ..., Rn) of individual preference orderings, for every
pair of social states x, y 0   X, and for every opportunity set S 0   K, if (x, y)  0   P(Ri)  for all i
0   N, then y Û   C(S), as long as x 0   S, where C = f*(RN).5 
Sen’s articulation of the freedom of action in social interaction proceeds by means of the
power of local decisiveness in social choice.  To begin with, let us say that a group D d   N of
individuals is locally decisive over a pair {x, y} d   X of social states if and only if D can
secure that y (resp. x) does not belong to C(S), where C = f*(RN) and S 0   K, as long as x
(resp. y) is available in S, by expressing unanimous preferences within D for x (resp. y)
against y (resp. x).  If it so happens that a singleton set {i} is locally decisive over {x, y} for
some i 0   N, we say that individual i is locally decisive over {x, y}.   
  
Sen’s Minimal Liberty Principle
There exist at least two individuals, say i, j 0   N, in the society such that, for each of
them k 0   {i, j}, there exists at least one pair {xk, yk} of social states which are k-variants and
k is locally decisive over {x k, y k}.
6The best intuitive illustration of this principle is given by Sen (1970b, p.152) himself: “Given
other things in the society, if you prefer to have pink walls [in your own bedroom] rather than
white, then [the] society should permit you to have this, even if a majority of the community
would like to see your walls white.  Similarly, whether you should sleep on your back or on
your belly is a matter in which the society should permit you absolute freedom, even if a
majority of the community is nosey enough to feel that you must sleep on your back.”
Sen’s justly famous Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal now reads as follows.
Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
There exists no collective choice rule which satisfies Unrestricted Domain, Weak Pareto
Principle and Sen’s Minimal Liberty Principle.
Since Sen’s Minimal Liberty Principle is an analytical formulation of the freedom of
action in the game-theoretic social interaction, whereas Unrestricted Domain and Weak Pareto
Principle jointly capture the minimal essence of the freedom of paricipation in the social rule-
making processes in the social choice theoretic framework, Sen’s impossibility theorem sends
us an unambiguous signal that the liberal social order, which embodies the two senses of free-
dom, is hard to come by, to say the least.  The Berlin-Sen problem is certainly deep and far-
reaching.
Before proceeding any further, two remarks on Sen’s articulation of the two senses of
freedom are in order.  In the first place, there are acute debates on whether or not Sen’s Mini-
mal Liberty Principle is an appropriate articulation of the freedom of action in the game-
theoretic social interaction.  Robert Sugden (1985), and Wulf Gaertner, Prasanta Pattanaik and
Kotaro Suzumura (1992) claimed that it was not, and they proposed an alternative game form
articulation of individual freedom.  We do not want to enter into this old battleground once
again; suffice it to say that Sen’s original insight, viz. the logical conflict between the two
senses in which we can talk reasonably about freedom, robustly survives even if we replace
Sen’s original articulation with the alternative game form articulation.6  
In the second place, Sen’s Minimal Liberty Principle articulates the freedom of action in
the game-theoretic social interaction in terms of the requirement which should be embodied in
the designed collective choice rule, just as Unrestricted Domain and Weak Pareto Principle
articulate the freedom of participation in social rule-making processes in terms of the conditions
to be satisfied by the designed collective choice rule.  In this sense, Sen’s approach treats the
two senses of freedom on a par with each other without giving any logical priority to one sense
of freedom over the other.  In contrast, we will depart from this symmetric approach to the two
senses of freedom by introducing the two stage structure of the liberal social order, where the
two senses of freedom are placed in some logical sequence.7             
7 3. Game Form Articulation of Freedom of Choice
The alternative articulation of the two senses of freedom makes use of the following
three basic concepts: the game form, the game, and the design of a fair game form.  
The game form is a triplet   = (N, M, g), where N = {1, 2, ..., n} (2 £ n < + 4  ) is the
set of players, M = M1 H   M2 H   • • • H   Mn is the set of strategy profiles with Mi standing for
the set of admissible strategies for the player i 0   N, and g is the outcome function which maps
each strategy profile m 0   M into the set X of outcomes: g(m) 0   X.  Although the game form
neatly describes what are admissible for each player as well as what outcome will materialize
when a strategy profile is specified, it does not describe the strategy which each player will
choose in the situation of social interaction.  
Let RN = (R1, R2, ..., Rn) be the profile of individual preference orderings on the set
of consequential outcomes.  Then the pair ( , RN) is a fully-fledged game, which describes not
only the possibility of strategic choices which are open for each player and the outcome to be
associated with each strategy profile, but also the underlying motivations which propel each
player to choose his admissible strategy in the situation of social interaction.  To proceed from
this description of strategic social interaction to the prediction on the strategy profile which will
be realized as a result of social interaction, however, we further need an equilibrium notion, say
, prevailing in the society.  Given the equilibrium notion  , a strategy profile m* and an out-
come x* are called an equilibrium strategy profile and an equilibrium outcome, respectively, if
and only if m* 0    ( , RN) and x* 0   g( ( , RN)) hold true, where  ( , RN) stands for the set
of equilibrium strategy profiles and g( ( , RN)) := {g(m*)|m* 0    ( , RN)}.  In this context,
we are able to put forward an alternative game form articulation of the first sense of freedom,
viz. the freedom of action in the game-theoretic social interaction.  
From the point of view of each player, however, a game form is the objective descrip-
tion of strategic social interaction into which he happens to be cast, and he is not in the position
to say anything about the structure of the game form itself.  To say anything concrete about the
fairness, or the lack thereof, of the game form, we need a logically prior stage in which the
design of a fair game form is publicly debated and socially chosen.  It is in this context of the
logically prior stage of public design and social choice that we are able to present an alternative
articulation of the second sense of freedom, viz. the freedom of participation in  social rule-
making process.  This aspect of our proposal will be discussed in Section 4.   
Back, then, to the freedom of action in the game-theoretic social interaction.  Note that
there are two aspects of this class of freedom which deserve to be carefully distinguished.  In
the first place, the freedom of action in the narrow sense means that each player is free to
8choose his admissible strategy as he sees fit.  In the second and wider sense, it means that each
and every player is warranted of the freedom to choose his beings and doings, viz. his func-
tionings in the sense of Sen (1980; 1985a; 1985b; 1985c; 1993) to pursue the life which he
chooses on deliberation.8  This wider sense of the freedom of action, which Sen (1985b)
christened the well-being freedom, is important enough to warrant a precise analytical formula-
tion.      
To lend concreteness to our exposition, consider a simple production economy consist-
ing of n (2 £ n < + 4  ) individuals.  Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} denote the set of individuals.  Only
one good y 0   ˙  + is produced from one input, viz. labour, where ˙  + denotes the set of non-
negative real numbers.  The production function    : ˙  +
n 6   ˙  + maps each vector of labour inputs
x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) 0   ˙  +
n into an output  (x) = y 0   ˙  +, where xi for each i 0   N denotes i’s
contribution of labour time.  Individuals have the same total time x0 (0 < x0 < +  4  ) which they
can use either for labour, or for leisure.  Individual i’s consumption vector is denoted by zi =
(li, yi) 0   [0, x0] H   ˙  +, where li = x0 - xi denotes his leisure, and yi denotes his output share.
Assume that there are m (2 £ m < + 4  ) types of functioning in the society, which are common-
ly regarded to be relevant from the viewpoint of well-beings.  Let C = (C1, C2, ..., Cn) denote
the profile of individual capability correspondences, where Ci: [0, x0] H   ˙  + 6  6   ˙  +
m for each
individual i 0   N denotes a correspondence which describes his ability to utilize the consump-
tion vector to attain various functioning vectors.  Thus, for any given consumption vector zi 0 
[0, x0] H   ˙  + for each individual i 0   N, he can choose freely any functioning vector in the set
Ci(zi) d   ˙  +
m.  Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume that the production function 
and the profile C of capability correspondences are given from outside and are fixed.
Given an objective economic environment e := ( , C), let Z(e) be the set of all feasible
resource allocations under e, which is defined as follows:
(1) Z(e) = {z = (z1, z2, ..., z n)|ú  i 0   N : zi = (li, yi) 0   [0, x0] H   ˙  + & 
                                                       åN yi £  (x), where li = x0 - xi and x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) }.
To capture the freedom of action in the narrow sense, we have only to define the game
form   = (N, M, g) by Mi = [0, x0] for each i 0   N and g: M 6   Z(e) .  Then we may assert
that the freedom of action in the narrow sense is fully warranted by allowing each individual to
choose without external constraints whichever labour-leisure portfolio he sees fit.  
9We are now ready to describe the freedom of action in the wide sense, viz. well-being
freedom in the sense of Sen, within our conceptual framework.  Given the game form  , the
equilibrium notion   prevailing in the society, an objective economic environment e = ( , C),
and a profile RN = (R1, R2, ..., Rn) of individual preference orderings over Z(e), let gi(m*)
be the consumption vector of individual i 0   N when an equilibrium allocation z = g(m*) is
realized through the equilibrium strategy profile m* 0    ( , RN).  Define gi ( ( , RN)) :=
{gi(m*)|m* 0    ( , RN)}.  Then we may say that i is assured of the freedom of access to the
set Ci(gi ( ( , RN))) of functioning vectors, viz. capability in the sense of Sen.
Note that the extent of well-being freedom of each and every individual hinges squarely
on 
(1) the objective economic environment e and the profile RN of individual preference orderings;
(2) the equilibrium notion   prevailing in the society; and 
(3) the game form  .  
Among these crucial factors, which determine the extent of well-being freedom in the liberal
social order, only the game form is an institutional framework which is essentially due to delib-
erate human design.  In order to deepen our analysis of well-being freedom à la Sen, therefore,
we must now proceed to the analysis of public deliberation processes for public design and
social choice of the fair game form.   
                  
4. An Alternative Articulation of Freedom of Participation
Sen’s criticism against traditional economic theory is multifaceted, but one of his crucial
points is that the traditional theory has too little structure [Sen (1977; 1982, p.99)]: 
A person is given one preference ordering, and as and when the need arises this is
supposed to reflect his interests, represent his welfare, summarize his idea of what
should be done, and describe his actual choices and behaviour.  Can one preference
ordering do all these things?  A person thus described may be ‘rational’ in the limited
sense of revealing no inconsistencies in his choice behaviour, but if he has no use for
these distinctions between quite different concepts, he must be a bit of a fool.  The
purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron.  Economic theory has
been much preoccupied with this rational fool decked in the glory of his one all-purpose
preference ordering.  To make room for the different concepts related to his behaviour
we need a more elaborate structure.
 
10Recollect that our game form articulation of individual freedom of action was baseed on
the profile RN = (R1, R2, ..., Rn) of individual preference orderings defined on the set of con-
sequential outcomes Z(e).9  Since the role played by these preference orderings is to guide
individuals in their choice of admissible strategies in the game-theoretic social interaction, these
preference orderings may well be construed as their subjective preferences in the sense of John
Harsanyi (1955), viz. preferences which express what they would regard as good from their
own personal points of view.  However, in the context of public design and social choice of
universal set of rules in the game-theoretic social interaction, viz. game form, we require quite
different and elaborate structure concerning individual preferences to be taken into considera-
tion by social rule-making process as the informational basis thereof.  There are at least two
reasons for invoking such an elaborate preference structure.
In the first place, these preferences should pay attention not only to the consequential
outcomes to be generated through the instrumental use of the game form, but also to the intrin-
sic value of the game form itself.  One need not be a devoted non-consequentialist to recognize
the intrinsic value of procedures along with their instrumental values.  Indeed, “an individual
may have a positive preference for achieving a given distribution through the free market
mechanism over achieving the same distribution through rationing by the government.  If the
decision process is interpreted broadly to include the whole socio-psychological climate in
which social decisions are made, the reality and importance of such preferences, as opposed to
preferences about the distributions of goods, are obvious [Arrow (1951, p.90)].”  Our ana-
lytical framework should be elaborate enough to find a room for accommodating such intrinsic
value of the game forms along with their instrumental value.
In the second place, freedom accompanies responsibility, and the freedom of participa-
tion in social rule-making processes seems to accompany the responsibility of its own.10  The
rule to be publicly designed and socially chosen should work as a universal code of behaviour
for individuals in their game-theoretic social interaction.  Thus, those who are endowed with
the right to participate in the social rule-making process should base their opinions not on the
prospective personal benefits which would accrue to them if the rule could be tailored to serve
to their personal needs and desires, but on the impersonal procedural features such as the equal
treatment of equals, impartiality, transparency, accountability, verifiability, informational
efficiency, and privacy-respecting.  To put it somewhat differently, it is the collaborative
responsibility of those who participate in social rule-making process to form and express their
deliberate individual public judgements, rather than subjective individual preferences of their
own.
The first step in formulating the social decision procedure for public decisions is to
give analytical substance to what we have just christened the individual public judgements.  Let
11 stand for the set of all game forms with the same set of players N such that, for each   0   
and an equilibrium notion   prevailing in the society, g( ( , RN)) d   Z(e) for each admissible
profile RN = (R1, R2, ..., Rn) of individual preference orderings.  
A pair (z,  ) 0   Z(e) H     is called an extended alternative, which signifies that an
allocation z 0   Z(e) is attained through a game form   = (N, M, g) 0    .  In particular, given e
and RN = (R1, R2, ..., Rn), an extended alternative (z,  ) is said to be attainable if and only if,
given the equilibrium notion   prevailing in the society, z can be realized through   in the sense
that z 0   g( ( , RN)).  The set of all attainable extended alternatives, given e, RN and  , is
denoted by A(e, RN:  ).     
We are now ready to define the crucial concept of an extended ordering  Q on the space
of attainable extended alternatives, viz. A(e, RN:  ), where (z1,  1)Q(z2,  2) holds for any
(z1,  1),(z2,  2) 0   A(e, RN:  ) if and only if realizing a feasible allocation z1 through a game
form 1 is judged at least as good as realizing an alternative feasible allocation z2 through an
alternative game form  2 according to the public judgements expressed by Q.  
The concept of an extended ordering is flexible enough to accommodate the extreme
consequentialism to the effect that (z,  1)I(Q)(z,  2) holds true for any (z,  1), (z,  2) 0 
A(e, RN:  ), where I(Q) is the indifference relation corresponding to Q.11  In another words,
an extreme consequentialist judges two attainable extended alternatives to be indifferent with
each other as far as their consequential outcomes remain the same.  Likewise, our concept of an
extended ordering can also accommodate the extreme non-consequentialism in the sense that
(z1,  )I(Q)(z2,  ) holds true for any (z1,  ), (z2,  ) 0   A(e, RN:  ).12  In another words,
extreme non-consequentialist judges two feasible extended alternatives to be indifferent with
each other as far as the procedures which lie behind their consequential outcomes remain the
same.  Barring these polar extreme cases, however, any extended ordering represents the pub-
lic judgements which are consequence-sensitive as well as procedure-sensitive. 
Since individual public judgements must provide the informational basis in the stage of
public rule-making, where all possible profiles of individual preference orderings must be taken
into consideration, we introduce the concept of individual public judgements function.  For
each i 0   N, let  i be a function which is defined on ã  , where  ã   stands for the class of all
logically possible profiles of individual preference orderings, and takes on values in the space
of individual public judgements on the set A(e, RN:  ) of attainable extended alternatives: For
each i 0   N, 
12(2) Qi =  i(RN) d   A(e, RN:  ) H   A(e, RN:  ) for all RN 0   ã  ,
where Qi satisfies the requirements of being an ordering, viz. completeness and transitivity.
Given the profile of individual public judgements functions  N = ( 1,  2, ...,  n), the public
rule-making procedure, to be denoted by  , should aggregate this profile into the social public
judgements function:   =  ( N).  Thus, for each actual expression of the profile RN of
individual preference orderings,  (RN) stands for the social public judgements on the set of
attainable extended alternatives  A(e, RN:  ), which is based on the social amalgamation of
individual public judgements.
Putting all pieces together, we are now in the position to describe the modus operandi
of the liberal social order we are envisaging in this paper.  
Step I: Individuals gather together to deliberate on the institutional set of rules that should be
universally applied in the stage of the game-theoretic social interaction.  They form their indi-
vidual public judgements functions over the set of attainable extended alternatives.  The profile 
N = ( 1,  2, ...,  n) thus formed is socially amalgamated through public deliberations into a
social public judgements function   =  ( N), where   stands for the public rule-making pro-
cedure.  
Step II: Once a profile RN of individual preference orderings is realized, the socially chosen
set of rules, viz. game form, may be identified as follows.  Let  (RN) be the set of all attain-
able extended alternatives at RN, which are socially judged as at least as good as any other
attainable extended alternatives, where the evaluative judgements are made in accordance with
the social public judgements  (RN).  This can be formally defined as follows:
(3) (RN) = {(z*,  *) 0   A(e, RN:  ) | ú   (z,  )  0   A(e, RN:  ): 
                                                            (z*,  *) (RN)(z,  ), where   =  ( N) }.
Then the set  (RN) of game forms which are judged socially best at RN can be defined by:
(4) (RN) = { * 0     | õ   z* 0   Z(e): (z*,  *) 0    (RN)}.
13Step III: Once the socially best game form is chosen and proclaimed to be the basic set of
rules which is universally applied to all individuals without discrimination, individuals in the
society are equally endowed with the freedom of action in the game-theoretic social interaction.
To be more specific, if the socially chosen and proclaimed game form is  * = (N, M*, g*)
when the realized profile of individual preference orderings is RN = (R1, R2, ..., Rn), then
individual i 0   N is assured of a full freedom of choice over his set M* i of admissible strategies.
Furthermore, he is fully endowed with a full freedom of access, viz. well-being freedom, to his
capability Ci(g* i( ( *, RN))).  This is the basic scenario of the modus operandi of the liberal
social order we are envisageing.   || 
There are four remarks which we think are relevant in clarifying our conceptual frame-
work.  
In the first place, it would be rather awkward if the publicly designed, socially chosen,
and universally proclaimed game form  * = (N, M*, g*) 0     should have to be switched to
another game form, say  ** = (N, M**, g**) 0    , whenever there were any change in the
profile RN of individual preference orderings.  Therefore, an important research agenda seems
to be to locate a set of conditions under which we can ensure the existence of a public rule-
making procedure   such that
(5) 1   { (RN) | RN 0   ã  } ¹ Ø
is guaranteed.  If (5) is satisfied, then there exists a socially best game form, say  **, which
can serve as the universally applicable set of rules which is valid for all profile RN as long as
the objective economic environment e remains the same.
In the second place, it may well be wondered where exactly the capability approach in
the analysis of well-being freedom plays an active role in our conceptual framework.  It plays a
crucial role in specifying the conditions to be satisfied by the social public judgements function,
which is obtained from the profile of individual public judgements functions through the appli-
cation of the public rule-making procedure.  A concrete example, which was worked out in full
analytical details in a paper by Reiko Gotoh, Kotaro Suzumura and Naoki Yoshihara (2000), is
the Rawlsian public judgements function which is characterized by the following two condi-
tions.  To begin with, let us say that a game form   = (N, M, g) is labour sovereign if, for all i
0   N, all xi 0   [0, x0 ] and all m-i 0   M-i, where m-i = (m1, ..., mi-1, mi+1, ..., mn) and M-i :=
M1 H   C  C  C   H  Mi-1 H   Mi+1 H   C  C  C  H   Mn,  there exists a strategy for i, say mi 0   Mi, such that
14gi1(mi; m-i) = x0 - xi.13  Let  LS be the set of all labour sovereign game forms.  Then the first
condition we impose on the public judgements function can be given as follows:
Priority of Labour Sovereignty 
For all  1 0    LS and all  2 0    \ LS, we must have (z1,  1)P( (RN))(z2,  2) for all
(z1,  1), (z2,  2) 0   A(e, RN:  ).
Since the labour sovereign game form enables each individual to secure the labour/leisure port-
folio as he sees fit, this condition seems to be an attractive feature of this game form from the
viewpoint of the Rawlsian principle of equal basic liberties.  The second condition we impose
on the public judgements function is meant to capture the essence of the Rawlsian difference
principle  in the Sen space of functionings rather than in the Rawls space of social primary
goods.  Let us define the crucial concept of common capability by
(6) CC(z) := 1   {Ci(zi) | i 0   N}, where z = (z1, z2, ..., zn) 0   A(e, RN:  ). 
We are now in the position to introduce the following:
Consistency with Capability Maximin  
For all (z1,  1), (z2,  2) 0   A(e, RN:  ), where either  1 0    LS or  2 Û    LS,
(i) CC(z1) e   CC(z2) implies (z1,  1) (RN)(z2,  2); and
(ii) CC(z1) e  e   CC(z2) implies (z1,  1)P( (RN))(z2,  2).
Since the common capability can be interpreted as the minimal capability to which even the least
favoured individual, whoever he may happen to be, is assured to have free and equal access,
the Rawlsian flavor of this condition seems to be substantial.  We will say that a public judge-
ments function is Rawlsian if and only if it satisfies the Priority of Labor Sovereignty and the
Consistency with Capability Maximin.  The research agenda is now to locate a set of conditions
under which there exists a “reasonanle” public rule-making procedure   such that the social
public judgements function generated by   is Rawlsian in the specified sense.14 
In the third place, in sharp contrast with the Arrow-Sen theory of social choice which
focuses on the social choice of consequential outcomes, our scenario of the liberal social order
assigns quite different role to the public rule-making procedure.  Indeed, what is to be socially
chosen is the basic set of rules of the game, and the consequential outcomes are determined in
15the decentralized fashon through the game-theoretic social interaction among individuals under
the publicly designed, socially chosen, and universally promulgated basic set of rules of the
game.  In the context of the theoretical articulation of the liberal social order, it seems to us that
this two stage framework has much to recommend itself.      
In the fourth place, the interest of our two stage framework lies not just in its theoretical
curiosity, but also in its natural correspondence with some social choice procedures actually in
use in domestic as well as international arena.  Apt concrete examples abound, but suffice it to
quote an instance from competition law and competition policy in the domestic arena.  The right
to participate in the fair game of competition, thereby trying one’s own life chance at one’s own
risk, is a valuable entitlement, and competition policy authorities are entrusted with the task of
ensuring that this entitlement is open to all willing and elligible agents by preparing fair and
transparent competitive field.  To cope with this crucial task, competition policy authorities
legislate a set of competition laws through public design and social choice, and monitor and
enforce, if necessary, sincere observance of the fair rule of competition in the market place.
Put otherwise, the task of competition policy authorities is not to arrive at any social choice of
consequential outcomes, but to prepare the fair competitive field in which decentralized compe-
tition will spontaneously discover consequential outcomes through individual experiments.
This seems to fit naturally in the two stage framework we have tried to develop in this paper.
     
5. Constitutional Democracy and Procedural Justice
As an auxiliary step in crystallizing the implications of our two stage framework from
the viewpoint of institutional design and social choice, let us remind ourselves of the fact that
there exist two contrasting approaches to the fairness of resource allocation rules.  The first
approach starts from some outcome morality that enables us to define the concept of fairness in
the space of consequential outcomes, viz. allocations, and derive the concept of fair allocation
rules therefrom: an allocation rule is fair if it can bring about fair outcomes for each economic
environment.15  In this approach, the outcome morality is defined independently of, and prior
to the allocation rule.16  It should be clear that this first approach bestows on the allocation
rules only the instrumental value in materailizing the presupposed outcome morality.  It should
also be clear that most if not all preceding contributions to fair allocation rules in welfare
economics and social choice theory are based on this first approach.  The second approach
reverses the order of logical inference altogether, and regards an allocation to be a fair con-
sequential outcome if it is brought about through the intermediation of a fair allocation rule.  In
this approach, it is the procedural fairness of allocation rules that is logically prior to the fair-
ness of allocations, and the concept of fair allocations is made subordinate to the fairness of
allocation rules.17  It should be clear that this second approach bestows on allocation rules the
16intrinsic value of their own, which is then imputed to the outcomes thereby generated.  Need-
less to say, the second approach to fair allocation rules is empty of contents until and unless we
can define the fairness of allocation rules without invoking anything like an outcome morality.
This is the crucial point of bifurcation among alternative theories of public decision-making
procedures.  
Recollect that Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice, which is widely regarded as a repre-
sentative as well as most influential attempt in substantiating the viewpoint of pure procedural
approach, hinges on his expectation that there should exist an unanimous agreement among
individuals on the two principles of justice in the primordial stage of rule selection behind the
veil of ignorance.  Quite to the contrary, our proposed two stage approach does not assume
unanimity among individuals who participate in the public rule-making process, neither do we
exclude due considerations of the consequential outcomes generated by the allocation rule to be
publicly designed and socially chosen in the first rule-making stage.  In other words, we recog-
nize not only the importance of the intrinsic value of procedures in conferring the agency
freedom to individuals, but also the instrumental value of procedures in conferring the well-
being freedom to individuals.  Instread of the Rawlsian unanimity, what we require in our
theoretical scenario are two-fold.  In the first place, we require that the individual public judge-
ments, on the basis of which the public rule-making procedure should operate to identify the
socially chosen allocation rule, should be impersonally and reflectively formed, responsibly
expressed, and flexibly adjusted and/or corrected through the public deliberation process.  In
the second place, the public rule-making procedure itself should be duly constrained by some
axioms of procedural justice such as the equal conferment of the agency freedom of participa-
tion, as well as by some axioms of substantive justice such as the equal conferment of the well-
being freedom.  On the basis of these two requirements of the equal conferment of the two
senses of freedom, one procedural in nature and the other substantive in nature, our two stage
articulation of the public rule-making process turns out to be a crystallization of the concept of
constitutional democracy.                     
The basic standpoint of constitutional democracy seems to have been best stated by von
Hayek (1960, p.181): 
Constitutionalism means that all power rests on the understanding that it will be exer-
cised according to commonly accepted principles, that the persons on whom power is
conferred are selected because it is thought that they are most likely to do what is right,
not in order that whatever they do should be right.  It rests, in the last resort, on the
understanding that power is ultimately not a physical fact but a state of opinion which
makes people obey. 
17Although we are in full agreement with von Hayek as long as this basic perception of
constitutionalism goes, there is a crucial difference between us concerning the value to be
attached to constitutional democracy.  The reason why von Hayek values democracy is not for
any intrinsic value thereof, but for its instrumental value in implementing spontaneous order
generated through individual experiments into the basic set of rules through majority decision,
thereby negating the existing set of rules, as well as those who are geting personal benefits
from the continuation of the status quo that is turning out to be a straightjacket constraining
innovative spontaneous experiments.  In contrast, we recognize not only the instrumental value
of constitutional democracy, but also the intrinsic value thereof, in that it is a unique social
decision procedure which embodies the agency freedom of participation in public rule-making
process.  Even though we are both supporting constituinal democracy as a public rule-making
process, the reasons behind our respective support seem to be rather different.
6. Concluding Remarks
Let us conclude by summarizing the main messages of this paper.
(1) In the liberal social order, there are two senses of freedom that are of crucial importance,
viz. the freedom of action in social interaction, and the freedom of participation in social rule-
making process.  
(2) The first sense of freedom, viz. the freedom of action in social interaction, can be sub-
divided into the freedom of action in the narrow sense, viz. freedom of choosing one’s admis-
sible strategies in the game-theoretic social interaction, and the well-being freedom in the sense
of Sen.  The second sense of freedom, viz. the freedom of participation in social rule-making
process, is tightly connected with the agency freedom in the sense of Sen.  Both freedoms are
of crucial importance as the social basis of self respect of individuals in the liberal social order.   
(3) It was Berlin who warned us that these two senses of freedom may well conflict with each
other.  Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal demonstrated that this conflict is not just possi-
ble, but is logically inevitable if we articulate these two senses of freedom in terms of the social
choice framework à la Arrow, where these two senses of freedom are formulated as two sepa-
rate axioms to be imposed on a par with each other on the admissible class of collective choice
rules.  
(4) An alternative articulation of the two senses of freedom can be developed, where the crucial
role is played by the concepts of game form, game, and the design of a fair game form.  In this
conceptual framework, the freedom of action in the narrow sense is warranted by allowing each
individual to choose freely any one of his admissible strategy in the game theoretic social inter-
action; the well-being freedom is warranted by allowing each individual to have free access to
the set of functionings, viz. capability, corresponding to the equilibrium outcome of the game;
18and the agency freedom of participation in public rule-making process is warranted by allow-
ing each individual to form and express his individual public judgements, which are then to be
aggregated into the social public judgements.  The social choice of a game form, viz. a set of
universally applicable rules of social interaction, is made in full accordance of these agreed-on
social public judgements.   
(5) Our two stage framework of public decision-making process can be interpreted as a formal
way of articulating the essence of constitutional democracy.  Unlike von Hayek, for whom the
value of constitutional democracy lies mainly in its instrumental role in implementing the newly
evolved spontaneous order, it is our belief that the constitutional democracy is not only of value
for its instrumental role, but also important for its intrinsic value of embodying the agency
freedom of participation in the public rule-making process.     
The proposed analytical scenario of constitutional democracy is an impure mixture of
constructivist rationalism, on the one hand, and evolutionary rationalism, on the other, since we
are bringing what is spontaneously evolved through individual experiments into the stage of
public design and social choice of a new institutional set of rules.  It is also an impure mixture
of perfect procedural fairness, on the one hand, and pure procedural fairness, on the other,
since the public judgements to be formed through public deliberations should pay due attention
to the intrinsic value of procedures in conferring agency freedom to individuals as well as to the
instrumental value of procedures in expanding well-being freedom of individuals.  In view of
this structural characteristics of the proposed analytical scenario, the best way to conclude this
paper seems to be to cite the following passage from Sen (1970a, p.200): “Both from the point
of view of institutions as well as that of frameworks of thought, the impure systems would
appear to be relevant. ...  [W]hile purity is an uncomplicated virtue for olive oil, sea air, and
heroines of folk tales, it is not so for systems of collective choice.”      
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* Paper presented at the Conference in Honour of Amartya K. Sen held at the Center for
Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, Germany, June 21-23, 2001.  We are most
grateful to Professor Amartya Sen, with whom we could talk about the issues discussed in this
paper over the years.  His influence on our way of thinking should be crystal-clear.  We are
also indebted to Professor Naoki Yoshihara, with whom we have been exploring the vistas
expounded in this paper.  We could receive helpful and clarifying comments from Professors
Martha Nussbaum, Prasanta Pattanaik, John Roemer and Amartya Sen at the Bielefeld Confer-
ence.  These comments were instrumental in preparing this revised version, and we would like
to express our gratitude to them all.  Needless to say, all the remaining deficiencies of the pre-
sent draft are our sole responsibility.  Last but not least, our gratitude goes to the financial
support provided by the Ministry of Education and Science of Japan. 
1  See also Robert Sugden (1989).
2  For more detailed overview and evaluation of the huge literature, which followed Sen’s
original contribution, those who are interested are referred to Sen (1992) and Suzumura (1991;
1996; 2001b).
3  The Arrow framework and the Sen framework can be linked with each other through the
assumption of collective rationality.  Given a choice function C on K, suppose that there exists
a preference relation R such that, for every S 0   K, we have:
(1*) C(S) = {x* 0   S |(x*, x) 0   R holds for all x 0   S},
which means that the choice described by C(S) can be construed as that of optimization of the
underlying preference relation R over S 0   K.  If (1*) holds for the given (C, K), we say that
the choice function C on K is a rational choice function, and R is the rationalization of C.  If the
rationalization R satisfies the axioms of an ordering to be stated in footnote 4 below, the choice
function C on K is said to be full rational.  If an additional assumption of full collective
rationality is made, the Sen framework can be connected to the Arrow framework through (1*),
where C = f*(RN) and R = f(RN).  Without this additional assumption, however, the Sen
framework is conceptually much wider than the Arrow framework.  For more details about the
theory of rational choice functions, see, among many others, Richter (1971), Sen (1971) and
20Suzumura (1983, Chapter 1).   
4  A binary relation R on X is complete if and only if (x, y) 0   R or (y, x) 0   R holds for all x, y
0   X, whereas R is transitive if and only if (x, y) 0   R and (y, z) 0   R imply (x, z) 0   R for all x,
y, z 0   X.  R is an ordering if and only if it satisfies completeness as well as transitivity.
         
5  For any binary relation R, P(R) denotes the asymmetric part of R, viz. (x, y) 0   P(R) if and
only if (x, y) 0   R and (y, x) Û   R.
6  See Suzumura (1983, Chapter 7; 1996) for more details on this and related points concerning
the impossibility of a Paretian liberal.
7  In an early attempt to find a way to resolve Sen’s impossibility theorem, Robert Nozick
(1974, p.166) made the following important observation: “Individual rights are co-possible;
each person may exercise his rights as he chooses.  The exercise of these rights fixes some
features of the world.  Within the constraints of these fixed features, a choice may be made by a
social choice mechanism based upon a social ordering; if there are choices left to make!  Rights
do not determine a social ordering but instead set the constraints within which a social choice is
to be made, by excluding certain alternatives, fixing others, and so on. ...  How else can one
cope with Sen’s result? ”  
To the extent that Nozick tried to resolve Sen’s impossibility theorem by assigning quite
different role to the two senses of freedom, his proposal has something in common with what
we are proposing in this paper, but the similarity ends there.  Our approach in its totality is very
different from Nozick’s constraint view of rights, which will become clearer as our theoretical
scenario unfolds.   
8  According to Sen (1985a, pp.10-11), “[a] functioning is an achievement of a person: what he
or she manages to do or to be.  ...  [It] is ... different both from (1) having goods (and the
corresponding characteristics), to which it is posterior, and (2) having utility (in the form of
happiness resulting from that functioning), to which it is ... prior.”  The capability of a person
is the set of functioning vectors from which he is capable of choosing.     
9  Each individual being warranted of well-being freedom, viz. freedom of choice of any func-
tioning vector from his capability Ci(gi ( ( , RN))), we will have to introduce a judgement
criterion in the space of functioning vectors, in terms of which he will make a reasoned deci-
21sions on the choice of functioning vector in his capability.  This is yet another arena where we
need more elaborate preference structure in order to develop a fully-fledged theory of the liberal
social order. 
10  Freedom of action in social interactions also accompanies the responsibility of its own,
which has been extensively discussed in the recent literature of responsibility and compensa-
tion.  See an informative survey by Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet (2002).
11  An illuminating and witful example of an extreme non-consequentialist preference ordering
was suggested by Joseph Schumpeter (1942, pp.190-191): “[C]onvinced socialists will derive
satisfaction from the mere fact of living in a socialist society.  Socialist bread may well taste
sweeter to them than capitalist bread, and it would do so even if they find mice in it.” 
12  For any binary relation R, I(R) denotes the symmetric part of R, viz. (x, y) 0   I(R) holds if
and only if (x, y) 0   R and (y, x) 0   R hold. 
13 gi1(mi; m-i) denotes the leisure component of i’s consumption vector gi(mi: m-i).  
14 Gotoh, Suzumura and Yoshihara (2000) also identified conditions under which the crucial
property (5) is satisfied by the essentially Rawlsian public rule-making procedure.   
15  Let   stand for the prespecified outcome morality, which enables us to identify the set of fair
allocations  (RN) d   Z(e) for any profile RN 0   ã  .  Then a game form   = (N, M, g) 0     is a
fair allocation rule if and only if g( ( , RN)) d    (RN) holds for any R N 0   ã  .  
16  In the terminology of John Rawls (1971, p.85), this first approach seems to embody the
standpoint of perfect procedural justice: “First, there is an independent criterion for what is a
fair division, a criterion defined separately from and prior to the procedure which is to be
followed.  And, second, it is possible to derive a procedure that is sure to give the desired
outcome.”
17  This second approach seems to embody the standpoint of pure procedural justice in the
sense of Rawls (1971, p.86): “[P]ure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent
criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is
22likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly
followed.”    
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